

A Proposal for the Coordination and
Management of Intelligence Programs and Activities
on the VC Infrastructure and Local
Irregular Forces

(Note: All recommendations relating to
personnel and funds must be
approved by CSA Headquarters.
However, no problem is anticipated
for arrangements worked out in
the field.)

Purpose

To undertake the integration of efforts of all U.S. and GVN organizations, both in intelligence collection and processing and in operations directed at the elimination of VC infrastructure and irregular forces. To ensure that basic programs conducted by different organizations and components, as relate to elimination of the VC infrastructure, are made mutually compatible, continuous, and fully effective. Initially these purposes will be sought in the three corps areas (I, II, and III) wherein Free World Military Assistance Forces are operating.

Assumptions

1. Each organization concerned (CSA, 523th MI Group, National Police Special Branch, Military Security Service, as well as the U.S. and ARVN combat forces and related intelligence detachments) has a general mission, of which the operation against the infrastructure and irregular forces is a part.

2. For purposes of management effectiveness, established military and civil management structures and lines of command will be utilized to the fullest extent possible. ~~On-site command structures on technical matters with field echelons will continue to function.~~ Differing procedures within the various components relative to staffing and personnel management, and differing statutory and regulatory procedures and limitations as relate to personnel, logistics and fiscal responsibility must be acknowledged.

3. While much has been accomplished against the VC infrastructure, much more can be accomplished by integration, unified management and joint coordination of the various programs in being. In addition, joint coordination and concerted action can generate substantial initiative and pressure on the GVN at all levels to bring about an effective and coordinated operation against the VC infrastructure.

For unified direction and for high-impact management of the various programs, reporting and information systems must be centrally developed, administered and controlled, and information specifications and criteria must be established centrally.

Discussion

1. Ultimately, success in prosecuting intelligence and repressive/disruptive operations against the VC infrastructure and local irregular forces demand that the following functions be performed:

a. Centralized evaluation of problems at all operating levels.

b. Continuous generation of centralized guidance, based on maximum current knowledge of the structure, strength and strategy of the target -- the VC infrastructure and irregular forces [and of the available forces responsive to US/GVN control.]

c. Realistic division of labor between the several echelons of operation, and vertical and lateral coordination of effort for efficiency and economy of effort.

d. Rapid and full communication in both directions between the various echelons, to ensure that guidance and progress reporting are timely and that support for lower echelons is adequate. The integrity of technical or specialized channels for flow of information and communications in both directions is essential for management purposes.

e. ^{Management and} Reporting/Information ^{and} Management systems must be created to supervise and identify problem areas in the attack on the infrastructure, and to make them responsive to management correction.

f. The organization and exploitation of a limited number of services of common concern.

2. Certain services of common concern can only be carried out effectively at the Saigon level, and a central staff mechanism is required to support the coordination of nationwide programs and operations. Moreover, since the command structure of the US civil and military organizations and of the U.S. advisory and command elements in South Vietnam all converge at the Corps National Zone level, it is necessary to establish at that level similar staff points or equivalent procedures for coordination of programs and operations. Nevertheless, the center of gravity of intelligence collection and synthesis concerning the infrastructure must be at the base and the main weight of the attack on the infrastructure must be generated at both province and district.

Recommended Plans

1. A joint, and within the near future combined staff mechanism, operating at National, Corps, and Province levels and which can supervise coordinated activity at the District level, be created. This mechanism will provide all U.S. elements, and ultimately all agencies,

with purposeful guidance and support. This mechanism should be directly responsive to Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and should support joint decision-making by a Mission level coordinating committee chaired by Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and including senior intelligence and operations representatives of MACV, OSA and OCO.

2. It is recommended that an Infrastructure Intelligence Collection and Exploitation (ICEX) Staff be created, to support Deputy COMUSMACV (RD). This will be a joint civilian/military staff, which will have managerial, staff and reporting functions. The staff will have the following composition: Director; Deputy Director and Executive Secretariat; an Intelligence Group, Operations Group, and Reports Management Group. The ICEX Staff will have the following general missions and functions:

a. Develop, coordinate, review and make recommendations regarding basic programs for mounting attacks on the VC infrastructure, local irregular forces, and related problems;

b. Monitor and review programs and operations relative to the attack and elimination of the infrastructure;

c. Develop, coordinate and administer a centralized reporting and information system. This will be a management control system, which will focus on key indices as relate to programs, performance, coordination, and which will attempt to identify and highlight problem areas.

d. Monitor and review operational procedures and performance at Sector (Province), Corps (Region), and National levels, in order to ensure coordination, integration and the attainment of high levels of performance. Recommend corrective actions.

e. Conduct and develop coordinated staff studies, situation reports and analyses, and coordinated staff recommendations within areas of standing responsibilities.

f. Conduct field investigations and reviews, and prepare staff analyses and recommendations.

3. Following are recommended components of ICEX Staff:

a. Office of the Director: Mission and Functions. The Director, ICEX will be the Senior U.S. coordinator for organizing the overall attack on the infrastructure, and in this capacity will support Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and the mission committee (para 1 above). The Executive Officer will function as rapporteur for committee meetings and will perform such administrative

support function for the ICEX as the director may from time to time require. At the earliest possible moment the ICEX committee should encourage the GVN to create an analogous organization and to appoint a counterpart for the Dir. ICEX.

b. Intelligence Group: Mission, Functions and Composition.
The Intelligence Group will be composed of two senior intelligence officers, one from MACV J-2 and one from OSA, and one stenographer. It will:

(1) Provide or arrange for the presentation within ICEX of current intelligence briefings, daily and weekly summary reports, and special intelligence presentations as relate to infrastructure.

(2) Organize and monitor the preparation and coordination of special inter-agency field intelligence studies and estimates concerning the VC infrastructure and local irregular forces.

Maintain close and continuing liaison with all principal intelligence production elements within the American Mission.

(4) Review, directly, selected categories of raw source material, as obtained from various elements and agencies. Special attention in this regard is directed towards selected captured documents, which yield particular insights into effectiveness evaluation of the attack on the infrastructure.

(5) Develop an intelligence evaluation system for measuring progress and impact in the attack on infrastructure.

c. Operations Group: Mission, Functions and Composition.
We adopt for this element the "Program Manager" concept. The Program Managers will be senior operational and management personnel, drawn from appropriate agencies to handle three specific programs (see below). Each Program Manager will have a deputy, drawn from the opposite service (an OSA Program Manager will have a MACV deputy, and vice-versa). A total of nine (9) officers and three (3) clerk typists is the estimated requirement. General mission and functions are:

(1) To undertake management review and supervision of certain specified and identified programs.

(2) To conduct and coordinate planning activities, the establishment of requirements, etc.

(3) To task appropriate elements of all components concerned with one aspect or another of the program for which he is responsible.

(4) To effect coordination among the several components.

(5) To monitor and review program understanding, program performance and program coordination at all echelons down to and including Sector (Province).

(6) To prepare operational guidance, directives and guidelines.

(7) To render advice, guidance and recommendations.

(8) As necessary, to have funds and resources made available (within legal limitations) for direct implementation, through tasked agencies, of specific projects.

1. We identify the following specific program areas for immediate appointment of Program Officers:

(1) Intelligence/Action Program. Within the Operations group, four officers will concern themselves with intelligence program evaluation, growth and proper functioning of intelligence coordination and dissemination systems, and action programs responsive to intelligence information. They will review basic programs, ensure their coordination and proper functioning at all echelons. They will develop and require a consolidated monthly report from Province Intelligence Coordinator (ICEX) assessing the adequacy of knowledge on VC infrastructure, steps taken to improve intelligence effort against it, problem areas, and special accomplishments.

They will also develop and require a Province/Sector monthly narrative report regarding actions initiated against the VC infrastructure, forces utilized (as distinct from offensive or defensive large unit military operations), problem areas, and recommendations for further action.

(2) Screening and Detention Program. This group of three officers will concern itself with the civil detention program. It will specifically address itself to the judicial treatment of VC civil defendants, and to the creation and operation of an adequate Vietnamese detention program for members of the infrastructure. See Annex 1.

(3) Interrogation Control Program. This group (two officers) will concern itself, jointly with the Intelligence/Action and the Detention Program group, with all aspects of interrogation exploitation of infrastructure prisoners, whether POWs or civil detainees and VC defectors, including the proper functioning of various systems in being, proper and prompt feedback of information from higher to lower echelons, and so on. See Annex 2.

e. Reports Management Group: Mission, Function and Composition. This group will be composed of four officers, and a visual aids specialist. This group will include representatives of OSA and MACV, a systems analysis specialist and a statistician. The Reports Group will:

(1) Design and produce, in consultation with the Intelligence and the Operations Groups, periodic reports for feedback to and support of Corps and Sector ICERX elements, concentrating and focussing attention onto infrastructure attack. (See Annex 3.)

(2) Review existing reporting systems of all U.S. elements, as they relate to or have a bearing on the attack on the infrastructure and our progress in this attack. Review will be from standpoints of adequacy, accuracy, comprehensiveness, economy, responsiveness to management requirements, consolidation and integration. In conjunction with the Operations Group, design and recommend an integrated reporting system.

(3) Provide specialist assistance in information systems analysis for the analysis, flow-charting, coordination and integration of intelligence collection and production systems (See Annex 3).

(4) Process statistical and graphical portions of reports, preparing presentations, graphics, maps, etc., as directed and required.

(5) Prepare statistical analyses and assist in interpretation of statistical data.

4. Corps Level ICERX Staff.

a. It is recommended that the OSA Regional Officer in Charge be designated Senior ICERX Advisor to the Senior Corps Advisor. He will be co-equal to the Corps G-2 Advisor, who is and will remain responsible for all military combat intelligence. At Corps, it is further recommended that an ICERX Committee

be formed, including Corps G-2 Advisor, Corps G-3 Advisor, appropriate FSBAP officers (when in contact from advising officers) Regional Chief 135th MI Group, 135th MI Group. The Corps ICENX Advisor will chair this committee. With the exception of this ICENX coordination role, no personnel shall hold operational relationships of 135th MI Group, 135th MI Group and OSA be analogous.

b. The structure of each of the U.S. and GVN agencies engaged in operations against the VC infrastructure includes a command echelon at Corps Tactical Zone level. It is at this level that GVN civil administration and military command come together, and it is here -- in three of the four Corps areas -- that the lines of command and action between the MACV Advisory system and U.S. troop commands converge. For smooth development of the overall program of intelligence and operations against the VC infrastructure, regular consultation and coordination at Corps level is essential. The coordination function at this level does not necessarily involve the centralization of such operations as intelligence collection, and supervisory efforts such as those of OSA and of the Regional Offices of the 135th MI Group are sufficiently strong to obviate the need for a supervisory effort. However, the exploitation of Saigon-based studies and ADP data collating to focus Corps Commanders and Advisory elements on the infrastructure problem, is a proper function of a Corps ICENX Committee (see below) and provision should be made for periodic briefing of the Senior Corps Advisors and their staffs.

c. Since the main burden of supervising the intelligence and reaction operations of Police Special Branch, the Communism Eradication, and PRU programs already rests upon the OSA Regional Office-in-Charge at each Corps Headquarters, the assumption by them of the ICENX coordinating function would entail the least disturbance of the current responsibilities of any of the military commands. Further, to assign the coordinating function to them would be a logical measure in view of the long-term Mission objective of making the GVN civil security authorities with which they deal the main instrument for countering subversive activity once pacification is achieved.

d. Functions of Corps ICENX Coordination.

(1) To establish immediately and convene periodically meetings of a Corps Intelligence Coordinating Committee, consisting of the Senior Intelligence Officer assigned to the Corps Advisor; Corps G-3 Advisor the chiefs of the

135th and 149th MI Groups, and the senior counterintelligence officer of the Military Intelligence Detachment assigned to support the U.S. forces in the Corps areas, and such other officers as are appropriate.

(2) To ensure proper and full utilization and exploitation of civil intelligence resources and information in Corps-planned and Corps-mounted military operations against infrastructure.

(3) To participate with Corps intelligence and operational elements in the planning and mounting of operations specifically directed against the infrastructure.

(4) With Corps Senior G-2 Advisor, to stimulate the effect of functioning and focus on infrastructure, of the Vietnamese Corps Intelligence Coordinating Committee or Center, as appropriate.

(5) To serve as the focal point for coordinating the assignment of GVN police, Special Branch, RGS and other elements to support sweep and destroy operations in the CTZ.

(6) To establish and monitor the operation of inter-provincial level intelligence exchanges between a Province Intelligence Coordinators, whether wholly within a given Corps area or involving provinces in two different Corps areas, as required by the territorial organization of VC provincial and regional level commands.

(7) To report periodically to the ICMX Staff Saigon on the interrelationships between VC infrastructure operations in the various provinces of the Corps areas and to recommend reinforcement of specific intelligence operations against the infrastructure.

(8) To establish, together with the Senior Intelligence Officer at Corps level, procedures to ensure that the provincial intelligence effort receives the maximum benefit from combat intelligence operations and that combat intelligence needs are fully considered, on a timely basis, in the coordination of infrastructure intelligence.

5. Senior (Province) ICMX Staff.

a. It is recommended that a single officer be designated as ICMX officer for the Senior Senior Advisor. This officer will be designated either from GSA or CND personnel in Province, as

appropriate, by Senior Sector Advisor in consultation with Corps ICN and Senior Corps Advisor and subject to the ratio. He will form and chair a Committee of appropriate American intelligence and operations personnel, for periodic and systematic consideration of and preparation of recommendations for attack on the infrastructure.

b. The center of gravity of intelligence operations against the VC infrastructure and irregular forces must necessarily rest at the province level. Coordination and division of labor is required at this level to ensure that maximum use is made of the limited professional/technical intelligence skills available in South Vietnam and, at the same time, that the closest possible link is maintained with subordinate intelligence and operating elements at the district level, where the bulk of the attacks on the low-level infrastructure and local guerrilla forces must be generated and carried out.

c. The coordinating functions that must be carried out at province level are:

(1) Intelligence operations

(a) Centralization of collation and dissemination to district level of raw intelligence generated by province level operations (PIC and IKV interrogations; agent operations; exploitation of captured documents; Census Grievance center reporting) and by district level operations outside the district being covered. It should be recognized that Police Special Branch Plans Sections or, alternatively, PIC Collation Sections are the natural center of gravity for such collation. Consolidation of infrastructure files at Province.

(b) Evaluation, collation, and transmission to higher echelons of intelligence from all agencies concerning the higher echelons of the VC target (province, interprovince, VC region, and COSVN) for processing (ABP), evaluation and analysis.

(c) Coordination with Sector 2-2 advisor on mutual exchanges of combat intelligence and infrastructure intelligence.

(2) Reaction Operations Coordination and Support

(a) Generation at Province level attacks on infrastructure.

(b) Organization of the augmenting and coordinating with district civilian intelligence elements of Police/ARV forces under the command of province authorities, in support of military sweeps and clearing operations.

(c) Resolution of conflicting priorities between those reaction operations, proposed at district level, which require province level support.

(d) Coordination with the Sector Advisor on reaction operations.

(3) Management and supervision

(a) Preparation for higher echelons of periodic program and problems reports.

(b) Guidance, support, and inspection of district level coordination operations.

(4) Intelligence collection coordination

(a) Promoting and systematizing province level source control. Stimulation and focussing of VI Province Intelligence Coordinating Committee.

6. District Level Coordination.

a. In selected Districts, District Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers will be formed. These District Centers will be combined Vietnamese/American centers, with appropriate American representation (Sub-Sector S-2 and a CI representative where possible) and including Vietnamese representatives from Police Special Branch, MSS, Census Grievance, Chieu Hoi, MD Teams, and so on. These Centers will serve as clearing-houses for immediate review, first-level collation and rapid dissemination of VC infrastructure information to reaction forces and to higher echelons (Sector, tactical units, etc). (See Annex 4.)

b. The intelligence personnel -- U.S. and Vietnamese -- available or likely to be made available for center duty at district level is certain to be small and unlikely to have the necessary background and experience in intelligence to do a fully professional job of intelligence collection on a continuing basis. Their assigned mission must be kept as simple as possible.

c. District level intelligence cooperation between U.S. and SVN elements cannot depend solely upon the intelligence collected locally. It requires steady inputting from Province level -- partly in the form of spot reports (agent reports, PIC interrogation reports) and partly in collated form as Village and hamlet target folders, periodically updated; intelligence estimates of VC strength and capabilities in adjoining areas; relevant intelligence concerning the areas which has been obtained in other districts. Terrain intelligence synthesized by military intelligence agencies (photo-recon, updated maps, collations of data on enemy movements, on base areas, and on enemy installations, etc.) must also be obtained and used.

d. Reaction forces permanently assigned to district level are usually limited and effective reaction often will require obtaining assistance from Province (Sector).

e. The prime functions of district level intelligence coordination should be (1) evaluating and pulling together of current intelligence locally procured (2) determining (against collated holdings provided from Province) the best course of action to be pursued as a consequence of current intelligence, to include both intelligence followup and rapid reaction operations with local forces under District (Sub-Sector) control (3) proposing to Province/Sector specific reaction operations (or specific targets for reaction operations) (4) periodically assessing, on the basis of intelligence acquired the resources of available intelligence collection efforts in the District.

f. In addition, District level intelligence elements should be prepared to provide intelligence support in the form of human assets with knowledge of the area and of local conditions (guides, Hoi Chanh, local police, etc), to the District when they are temporarily assigned to the District for certain operations.

g. In Districts where no SOICC are established, the Sector ICMA Advisor will be responsible for ensuring the fullest and most timely dissemination to Sub-Sector personnel of all pertinent Province produced information, and will attempt to stimulate and encourage its fullest utilization.

The Screening/Detention Problem

1. A problem which has already reached critical proportions in Vietnam concerns the growing burden of handling large numbers of civilian detainees, swept up in military operations, and also those arrested in more normal fashion.
2. First and foremost is the total inadequacy of physical facilities in being for either processing, holding or imprisoning civil detainees. Such prisons or prisoner compounds as exist are enormously overcrowded, and all categories and varieties of suspects, persons awaiting trial, those already tried and convicted, and so on, are crowded indiscriminately in these existing facilities. The first requirement is adequate physical camps, permitting proper segregation of and proper controls over the various categories of individuals.
3. Another serious aspect of the same problem is the question of screening the civil detainees, so as to permit the rapid sorting out of those VC who should be processed from an internal stand-point and those who should be processed judicially for long-term imprisonment. Equally important here is the rapid identification of innocent civilians, so that they can be released (after proper registration and record making), either to go back to their villages or to refer to as refugees. As refugees, there must be arrangements made, physical facilities and material provided, and so on.
4. Those who are detained for further processing are, of course, then at the mercies of a totally inadequate and antiquated judicial system, with the result that they must wait for 6 to 12 months or a year before their cases are reviewed and determination is made. In the meantime they are living under sub-standard conditions, without useful occupation, and numbers apparently escape or manage to find their way out. Both controls and records are lacking, so that no one really knows how many such people there are, who they are, and what happens to them.
5. One result of the inadequacies of the system is that in a number of instances, detainees are released almost immediately, even if substantial bodies of evidence may exist against him: the Province authorities can neither imprison them nor feed them.
6. These problems -- conservation of screening and detention facilities, judicial reform and streamlining, greatly increasing the speed or rate of handling, coordination with refugee activities, creating a meaningful and accurate registration and record system, and so on -- are closely related to the elimination of infrastructure.

It does little good to acquire large bodies of intelligence information, conduct operations throughout the country, both military and civil, capture or arrest all kinds of VC, only to put them into a system which permits them to be released, to escape, or to buy their way out and go back into operation.

7. There is desperate and highest priority need, therefore, for the creation of adequate screening, detention, registration and judicial facilities and systems. There is need first of all for the immediate creation of detention/screening facilities for civil detainees, similar to POW facilities. There is, moreover, need for administrative legislative action by the GVN to facilitate judicial disposal of the thousands of pending cases. And finally, there is need, in conjunction with detention, registration and judicial processes, for devising a system to keep track of these subjects, know what their disposition was, and know where they are and what they are doing, either inside or outside the prison system.

8. It is therefore proposed and recommended that a Prison Officer with two assistants be located in the operations group of the ICEX Staff. The Assistant would be responsible for case construction, and the other would be a legal specialist concerning himself with judicial reform question. It seems quite probable that this group will require funds and material to make available to it from appropriate agencies, in order to proceed with its work with all possible speed.

Interrogation Control Group

1. VC suspects and prisoners are being captured or selected by military units, by the National Police, by Provincial Security Units, and by the Military Security Service. Other less desirable VC personalities become available for intelligence exploitation through the Chieu Hoi program. It provides the coordination and management of their exploitation to acquire the maximum intelligence on the VC infrastructure and its regular force target and to ensure that significant personalities do not resist interrogation successfully or escape identification is inadequate.

2. A common services group is required:

a. To identify rapidly significant sources whenever they enter the system.

b. To ensure that local interrogation operations at province/sector level are adequately focussed on and adequately supported with intelligence inputs from all components the infrastructure target.

c. To ensure that adequate interrogation/detention facilities are established and maintained with full support from all components involved.

d. To facilitate the prompt identification and transfer of selected sources to the interrogation facility best equipped to exploit their knowledge fully.

e. To resolve questions of priorities in the interrogation process.

f. To ensure that a central record is maintained on a continuing basis of particularly knowledgeable and cooperative sources who should be readily recoverable for reinterrogation.

SICV - Automatic data processing of VC target personalities for
"Political CS" reporting.

1. The ADP system established by USAF 3-2 is SICV for compiling personality information on VC target personalities is a highly important source of support for Corps, Sector (Province) and District intelligence and exploitation operations. The present system provides for development of the data base by the preparation of input sheets on the basis of interrogation reports, captured documents, agent reports and finished or semi-finished intelligence collations, received from Sector 3-2, CSRS, ONIC, NIC. Through Combined Intelligence Staff the Provincial Interrogation Center interrogation reports and Police Special Branch provincial collations of infrastructure organization are also being provided; Special Branch and CSO (SOC) spot is being can also be made available. In addition to the input generated by the Political CS section of SICV itself, an additional input is at present being received from the Combined Intelligence Staff (CS-4), located at the General of National Police in Saigon. This staff has the responsibility for the inputting into the ADP system of all data concerning VC personnel in the city of Saigon, the city of Hue, Cia Binh, Di An District of Hue Province, the city of Hue Province, and other VC organizational elements being the organization of VC Military Region 1. A study should be made of the ADP system as it is at present constituted and of the feasibility of the ADP system to produce collated printouts for the Corps, Sector (Province) and District coordination on a regular basis.

2. On the basis of the experience acquired in the CS coordination operation, a determination should be made concerning the feasibility of decentralizing certain input operations to the collation sections of selected Police Special Branch Provincial Interrogation Centers, to provide for the collection and inputting of data from all intelligence collecting elements at provincial level. This proposal is based on the assumption that other GVN agencies can be induced to assign personnel to work with the CSO collation staffs in this field.

3. The feasibility of producing printouts which can be used by Vietnamese intelligence personnel at province and district level who have no command of English should also be explored.

4. A determination should be made concerning the exclusion of certain marginal categories of VC personalities from the ADP operation. In this regard, suitable criteria for selection for the production of print-outs should also be established.

10 April 1967

Trip Report: Visit to Dien Ban, Binh Thuan, and Quang Nam, to
review the situation of District Intelligence Coordination
Centers

1. Dien Ban District Operation Intelligence Coordination Center.
The Dien Ban center is the first District coordinating center established and has been in operation approximately 2 1/2 months (as of 11 April 1967). The Dien Ban District is in the area of the First Marine Division and the original purpose for district intelligence coordination was made through the Commanding General of the First Marine Division and as a result of the 1966-67 support and cooperation of the Marine Corps. At Dien Ban, the center is located in the Sub-Sector 1 compound. A prefix of approximately 200 sq. ft. in dimensions was erected there by the U.S. Marine Corps. The center has located two Americans, a Lt. Fisher and the Third CI Team of the First Marine Division and a Lt. Marine Area Sub-Sector. There are in the center two U.S. Marine representatives, one from the representative, one National Police, the interpreter/translator and three clerk/typists. One of the U.S. Marine is an ARVN Major and from the Third CI Team; he was provided by the Census Grievance. The typists were hired and their salaries paid by the USA through the military base. There are eight desks, two typewriters and a file cabinet provided by Census Grievance. Electric fans and maps have been provided by the Marines. Office supplies are provided by the Census Grievance. The center separately requires a 2.5-ton safe which the Marines are supposed to provide but is not yet available. The Dien Ban Center has no radio communication but there is a radio in the Sub-Sector office, this however can only be used for very high priority traffic. Normal communications are by landline to Sub-Sector and to Headquarters of the First Marine Regiment. This is a poor situation, however, because the landlines are constantly being cut by the VC.

The purpose of the center is to establish a District Level for review, collation and dissemination of local information. This is provided by various intelligence agencies operating in the Sector and in the District. These are National Police, Police Special Branch, Census Grievance, RV, US and ARVN. The US input and the RV goes into the center through the National Police representative. ARVN input theoretically comes through the American officer. This entire procedure is in contrast to previous arrangements whereby information would be reported in each agency's own channels to Province (Sector) and then redisseminated to the other agencies. Information is received in the center from contributing agencies and is

immediately circulated around to all representatives for provision of supporting information from their own sources. It is then relayed to First Marine Regiment Headquarters. At the end of each day, all information is summarized for Sub-District, District and First Marines. Within the center the records are handled by the Americans. Lt. Morse handles OB reports and collection and Lt. Fisher handles infrastructure files and source control and files. Source control which is just beginning, is not a true-time file; each of the contributing agencies has agreed to identify its sources by ID number. This step will not, however, be taken. The next step, that of plotting the location of all of these sources on an overlay, will likewise not be taken until a field map is available.

3. Reaction capabilities in and adjacent to the District are the First Marine Regiment (5 battalions), some ARVN units in the Western part of the TACH. There are five Vietnamese battalions in the District, four of these are in the ID guiding area. The police capability in District is practically non-existent. There are 11 uniformed Police in Binh San. He has the appearance of a police officer; they are however available on call from the District. For all practical purposes the Center is functioning as a clearing house for tactical information for the Marine Battalion.

4. Not only does the center provide quick and accurate information but it is also a reliable source of information for identification to the operating units. In late 1970 when the center had provided up to 50 guides to the District, the District. These guides have been used by all units, Census Companies, Police, District Chief, Sub-District Chief. In an incidental point, I noted that the Marines also frequently take one or several National Policemen with them on special operations but this does not appear to be an SOP.

5. In the operations themselves, the District has been used to sort out suspects or detainees and through the District's physical evidence, by some informant or by the District's guides, suspects are detained. The District is now reporting that the capturing battalions are beginning to check the records of people picked up through the center. When identification is made the individual may be delivered by the Marines directly to the Province PIC in Ho Chi Minh. The bulk of the detainees are turned over to the District Police and they, lacking facilities to detain or process these people, release most of them to go back to their villages. The District Police will if a positive case exists against an individual, send him to the Province. The District in the Center were convinced that a number of police were being used over and over again. This turned out, however, to be more a matter of suspicion than it was a fact which can be demonstrated. The system, especially on the record-keeping side, was not adequate to prove that repeat captures are being made.

6. The Center receives the full report from VC Richard, also of the Third GI Team who works in the Province Intelligence Coordinating Center (PICC) at Noi An. VC Richardson, for example, makes a daily run visiting the Center and brings direct PNC reports, Province Special Branch reporting and any other information received at Province level.

7. During the period 23 March to 19 April the Center has chalked up 42 VC KIA, 2 WIA and 57 probable kills as result of operations in reaction to its reporting and dissemination. From 6 April through the 11th, 11 positive identifications were made of VC through information provided by the Center. As noted above in the 2 1/2 month time period, the Center has provided approximately 30 guides. In February the Center disseminated 133 reports and in March 135. The average rate at this time, 11 April, is about 5 reports a day. The information time lag on dissemination of information has been cut at the very least by 24 hours and in most cases more.

8. Hien Nhon District Center is a new center for the Center. At Hien Nhon the DOICC has been open since 21 March and has been operating since yesterday. The Hien Nhon Center is staffed by a Sgt. Ford from the Third Marine GI Team and is physically sitting in a Police Special Branch Office, a line Sector S-2 representative and a Census Clearance man. It has also a National Police Officer, for an ID representative and a line representative. It is located in the District headquarters compound which, however, as noted above had been overrun by the VC and the building destroyed approximately 8 or 10 days previously. The Center has 10 desks and 2 typewriters, one of which is a loan of a typewriter of one of the ODA officers. They have two cipher machines, two transmitters and one interpreter. They do not have a guard in the building and the National Police has too few personnel to provide a guard. Since the Center has been in operation such a short period of time, I did not inquire in detail as to the procedures followed in the District or as to procedures followed, since in this case they do not really exist yet. In general the work in the Center is expected to be the same as at Dien Ban. Information comes in from various agencies and in some cases directly from agents and informants and couriers. Information is circulated around for current use and dissemination and is then reported by field telephone lines to the Sector at Noi An. A Captain at the Sector then puts the information forward to operating units. As at Dien Ban, VC Richardson brings reports direct to the DOICC from Sector and from 3 AM on a daily basis. Sgt. Ford, as a matter of interest, had two PNC reports sitting on his desk while we were talking. The District Police Officer has available to Sgt. Ford his VC political and military C. I. and a document approximately 3/8th of an inch thick, written in typed single space; Sgt. Ford had been tremendously impressed by this VC C.I. and feels that it will be an invaluable addition to the work of the center.

9. After the overrun, MACV Sector has pulled out 3-2-2, so that these people, including Sgt. Ford, have to come to Binh Khon each day. As an incidental observation, Sgt. Ford said that both Police Special Branch and General Grievance Center gave people and timely prior warning of the VC attack on Binh Khon. Sgt. Ford stated that the average number of reports being received in the center are between 5 and 10 a day, although today, 12 reports had already been received.

10. Phuong Dien BIOC. Binh Khon Sector. At Binh Khon the Centers are only being installed and are not yet operational. A Marine sergeant is assigned to the project in B-3. This sergeant, Sgt. Glen McKinney, was extremely enthusiastic about the project. He explained that the entire idea of the District Center was to break down the conflicts and jealousies of the various intelligence agencies. In Binh Khon the proposals were made to the Vietnamese Provincial Chief and were also to the MACV Sector Advisor, and suggestions made through them.

11. The Phuong Dien Center is constituted and has a representative from the National Police Special Branch, the General Grievance Center, two people from 3-2, a District Chief, a representative, a Marine from the First CI Team of Third Division, a Sub-Sector 3-2 representative and the Senior Sub-Sector Advisor. At the present time this group is meeting as a committee once a week, at which meeting they compare reports from their own agencies. So far they have not had space for an office but it is planned, and that space is available and supplies are coming, that the Center will become a regular Center operating on a staff basis similar to the ones now in Quang Nam Province. The office space is in the Sub-Sector compound; it is the former living quarters for the Sub-Sector 3-2 Officer (ARVN) who was killed in action on 16 March 1968. The Phuong Dien Center has no communications other than MACV Advisory to the Command.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Infrastructure Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX)

Deputy Commander (no)

Assistant for Korea

Director, ICEX (CS-1)
Deputy Director, ICEX (MACV)
(Two top staffs)

Executive Officer

Secretariat

1 officer (admin)
(plus 1 secretary)

Intelligence Group

Operations and Inspection Group

Reports Management Group

Officers
1 MACV
1 OSA
Secretary

1. Intel/Action Program - 4 officers*
2. Screening/Detention Program - 3 officers*
3. Interrogation Control Program - 2 officers*
(plus 3 stenographers/clerk typists)

(4 Officers) (1-MACV)
(1-OSA)
1-Systems analyst
1-Statistical analyst
1 visual aids specialist
(MACV-MCO)
(+ 3 clerk/typists)

IX (RD)
Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

ICEX Coordinator

Corps

II Corps

III Corps

IV Corps

Intelligence
Coordinators (ICEX)

S-E-C-R-E-T